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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Issue no.18 /2006



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Philosophy of Linguistics. Introduction    
The Myth of Human Language    
Testimony and Illusion    
Translated Title: Testimony and Illusion
Publication: Croatian Journal of Philosophy (18/2006)
Author Name: Barber, Alex;
Language: English
Subject: Philosophy
Issue: 18/2006
Page Range: 401-429
No. of Pages: 29
File size: 178 KB
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Summary: This paper considers a form of scepticism according to which sentences, along with other linguistic entities such as verbs and phonemes, etc., are never realized. If, whenever a conversational participant produces some noise or other, they and all other participants assume that a specifi c sentence has been realized (or, more colloquially, spoken), communica-tion will be fl uent whether or not the shared assumption is correct. That communication takes place is therefore, one might think, no ground for assuming that sentences are realized during a typical conversation. I re-ject both this ‘folie-à-deux’ view and the arguments for it due to Georges Rey. I do so by drawing on Gilbert Harman’s no-false-lemmas principle. Since testimony is a form of knowledge and, according to the principle, knowledge cannot depend essentially on false assumptions, testimony is incompatible with the claim that sentence realization is but an illusion. Much of the paper is given over to defending this appeal to the no-false-lemmas principle. After all, a more attractive option might seem to be to infer instead that the principle is itself falsifi ed by the folie-à-deux view.
Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language    
Could Competent Speakers Really Be Ignorant of Their Language?    
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Dialogue on the Philosophy and Methodology of Generative Linguistics    
The Knowledge in Language    
Intuitions: The Discrete Voice of Competence    
Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to Devitt    
Defending Ignorance of Language:Responses to the Dubrovnik Papers    
James McGilvray (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky    
Kit Fine, Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers